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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
nature of a trust, he should say this is "in trust," or he should in-
struct the bank "to collect and notify me" or to "collect and
remit" or notify the depository that "this is a special deposit."
Apparently, the court has accepted such instructions as indicat-
ing the intention of the parties, even though the transaction in
substance does not bear out the trust.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was intended
to safeguard deposits, and today it should not make any differ-
ence whether the deposit is general or special except in those
cases where the amount is over the $10,000 allowed by the insur-
ance. This insurance will reduce the number of cases consider-
ably, but there still may be a few cases which will involve more
than the insured amount. If such cases do come up, it is hoped
that a consistent policy will be followed by the court.
PAUL CASTOLDI.
WESTERN WATER RIGHTS:
MAY THEY BE TAKEN WITHOUT COMPENSATION?
In view of the fact that west of the 97th meridan, where
the climate varies from subhumid, to semi-arid, to arid with some
750,000,000 acres of arid lands of which only 21,000,000 are irri-
gated with streams incapable of supplying more than a fraction
of the water that could be beneficially used, and with annual
precipitation varying from twenty inches to less than five inches,
it is really apparent that water has come to mean everything, and
any existing property right in it has become invaluable.' Because
this is so, the time has now come when it is necessary to determine
to what extent rights in western water are recognized and to what
extent those recognized rights are protected in the individuals
owning them from the encroachment of the Federal government.'
One of the more important questions relating to the pro-
tection and recognition of such rights wherein the rights of in-
dividuals were asserted against the rights of the Federal Gov-
ernment was presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States in June, 1950.'
"'This condition of the arid region (west of the 97th meridian), and
the imperative necessity for irrigation to render it productive, is a mat-
ter of such common knowledge that the courts judicially take notice
that land within this region will not produce agricultural crops with-
out irrigation." 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS. p. 400. (2d.
ed. 1912).
2For a very able discussion of water law in Montana, see Heman, Water
Rights Under the Law of Montana, 10 MONT. L. REv. 13.
'U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 70 S.Ct. 955, 94 L. Ed. 1231
(1950).
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This case involved the rights of riparian owners of "uncon-
trolled grass lands" along the San Joaquin River in California,
who benefited for a few days each year from the natural seasonal
overflow of the stream. The Federal Government in construct-
ing the Friant Dam as a part of the Central Valley Project termi-
nated this overflow by diverting the water to the north and south
through a system of canals. The result will be that the vanish-
ing San Joaquin inundation will not be replaced. The lower
court awarded claimants compensation, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Although it was held that the river afforded
navigation, but only at tidewater levels, the Court concluded that
the navigation consequences of the project were economically in-
significant as compared with the values realized from redistribu-
tion of water benefits." And further, the Court held that inas-
much as the project from the beginning had provided for com-
pensation and compliance with state law, claimant was entitled
to compensation.!
Two issues were posed to the Court here: (1) Is there an
obligation on the part of the government to pay for the de-
struction of water rights bordering on a navigable stream, and
(2) If there is such an obligation, do these claimants have recog-
nizable water rights? Inasmuch as the latter of these two ques-
tions has been adequately dealt with,6 this discussion will be lim-
ited to the first question.
In the Gerlack case, the government sought to escape paying
compensation on the ground that the overall project was author-
ized by Congress as a measure for the control of navigation, and
that by reason of the government's superior navigation easement,
there were no constitutional rights of compensation. The Court
replied to this saying that since the navigation servitude was not
invoked by Congress, it was not necessary for it to decide whether
a general declaration of purpose was controlling where inter-
ference was neither the means nor the consequence of its ad-
vancement elsewhere.! Further, the Court said it was not neces-
sary to decide whether by virtue of a highly fictional navigation
purpose the government could destroy the flow of a navigable
stream and carry away its waters for sale to private interests
without compensation to those deprived of them, for here Con-
gress had not attempted such a thing. Briefly, the Court felt
that the legislative intent was to compensate because various acts
'U.S. v. Gerlach, 8upra, note 3, at page 957.
Id. at p. 964.
61 STAN. L. Rsv. 172 (1948) ; 38 CAr. L. Rv. 572 (1950).'See note 3 supra, at p. 962.
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reauthorizing the Central Valley Project directed that the pro-
visions of the Reclamation law should govern its construction
There is ample authority to uphold the government's con-
tention that there is a superior navigation easement which may
be exercised without a duty to compensate for the property taken.
One of the earliest cases extending the Commerce Clause to the
control of navigation was Gibbmns v. Ogden,' wherein it was
stated:
"The power of Congress . comprehends naviga-
tion, within the limits of every state in the Union, so far
as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected
with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the sev-
eral states, or with Indian tribes'."
The extent of this superior easement is most adequately
stated in the New River case," where the Court, citing the Chan-
dler and Ashwander cases,' said:
"The Federal government has domination over the
water power inherent in the flowing stream, it is liable
to no one for its use or non-use. The flow of a navigable
stream is in no sense private property. 'That the run-
ning water of a great navigable stream is capable of
private ownership is inconceivable.' Exclusion of
riparian owners from its benefits without compensation
is entirely within the government's discretion."
And, this paramount power of the Federal government
is not limited to control in aid of navigation, for it is said
that the authority is for the regulation of commerce on its wa-
ters. Navigation is but a part of the whole, which includes
flood protection, watershed development, and recovery of the
cost of improvements through utilization of power." And furth-
er, this power is no longer restricted to those streams navigable
in fact, or in law, for as it was recently stated:
"... Power of flood control extends to the tributaries
of navigable streams. For just as control over the non-
navigable parts of a river may be essential to the navi-
gable portions, so may the key to flood control on a
OI. at p. 964.
922 U.S. 1, at page 197 (1824).
"U.S. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424; 61 S.Ct. 291,
308; 85 L. Ed. 243 (1940).
U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 66, 69; 33 S.Ct.
667; 57 L.Ed. 1063, 1078, 1080 (1913). Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 330; 56 S.Ct. 466; 80 L.Ed. 688, 702 (1936).
"See note 10 ,upra, 311 U.S. at page 426. See also 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION
AND WATER RIGHTS, pp. 15-20. (2d. ed. 1912) as to the importance of
guarding the watersheds as an aid to navigation.
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navigable stream be found in whole or in part in flood
control on its tributaries.' ''
Thus, it is apparent, if we assume, as the Court apparently
did in the Gerlach case, that the stream was navigable,1' the gov-
ernment had ample authority to support its contentions. On the
other hand, claimants also were supported in their suit for com-
pensation by authority, especially in the form of Congressional
expressions of intention. It is evident that throughout the his-
tory of "desert land" legislation the intention of Congress has
been to protect vested water rights in the seventeen "desert
land" states. This is best shown by reference to a few of such
acts. Thus, for example, Section 8 of the Reclamation law of
1902 provides:
"Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as af-
fecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere
with the laws of any State or Territory by relating to
the control, appropriation, use, or other distribution of
water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired
thereunder. .. . '5
A more recent declaration of the same intention is expressed
in the 1944 Omnibus Flood Control Act, as amended in 1947.
"... . . it is hereby declared the policy of Congress to
recognize the interests and rights of States, . . . to pre-
serve and protect to the fullest extent established and
potential uses, for all purposes, of the waters of the Na-
tion's rivers; .... '
"The use for navigation . . . of waters arising in
States wholly or partly west of the ninety-eighth meri-
dian shall be only such use as does not conflict with any
beneficial consumptive use, present or future, in States
lying wholly or partly west of the ninety-eighth meri-
dian, of such waters for domestic, municipal, stock wa-
ter, irrigation, mining, or industrial purposes.""
Upon considering this very brief background of authority
supporting the contentions of the contestants in the Gerlach case,
the correctness of the reason for the Supreme Court's conclusion
may seriously be questioned. As in every case of interest, the
soundness of a decision can only be ascertained by a careful
'8Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, at p. 525,
61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941). See also Kinney, note 12 supra, at
pages 597 to 600 where the same principle is stated.
"See note 3 supra, at page 957.
'sJune 17, 1902, Ch. 1093 § 8, 32 STAT. 390, 43 U.S.C.A. 383.
L61ec. 22, 1944, Ch. 665, § 1, 58 STAT. 887 as amended July 26, 1947, Ch. 343,
§ 205 (a), 61 STAT. 501, 33 U.S.C.A. 701-1.
"Id. 33 U.S.C.A. 701-1 (b).
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viewing of the grounds on which the Court rejected one party's
agrument and accepted the other's. So here, why did the Court
reject the government's argument by saying, "We conclude that,
whether required to do so or not, Congress elected to recognize
any state-created rights and to take them under its power of
eminent domain." ?"
Here, once again, the Supreme Court has been called upon
to decide whether the owner of a water right acquired under
State law has a sufficiently substantial right to protect him
against a taking without compensation by the Federal govern-
ment pursuant to the exercise of its power under the Commerce
Clause." And once again it has left the question undecided. It
is submitted that this is to the consternation of those thousands
of people of the West who are possessed at the present time with
valuable property rights in water,' and who are, in most cases,
dependent upon such water rights for their livelihood.' Under
this decision it is entirely possible, if Congress should elect to
do so, for virtually every acre-foot of water to be claimed as be-
longing to the Federal government and to be taken without com-
pensation to either the States or the individual owners in the
States."
As was suggested in the previous paragraph, this is not the
first time in recent years that the Supreme Court has been called
upon to decide this question. In the case of Nebraska v. Wyo-
ming, the government asked the Court to hold that Section 8 of
the Reclamation law was not mandatory on the Secretary of the
Interior, but merely directory, and the Court answered by saying,
"Whether they [water rights] might have been obtained by
'See note 3 supra, at p. 963.
"See note 11 supra. See also in this connection Gilman v. Philadelphia,
70 U.S. 713 (1865). "Commerce includes navigation. The power to regu-
late commerce comprehends the control, . . . of all the navigable waters
of the United States.. . ." p. 724.
"01 Wixr, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATEs, p. 787. (3d. ed. 1911)
to the effect that riparian rights do exist in navigable streams. See also
HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WEST, p. 37 (1942), and 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, pp.
798, 799. (2d. ed. 1912).
"See note 1, supra.
"In the event that Congress should so elect, consider what one writer
says. "Water is of such vital and increasing importance that its control
would give its possessor a mastery over his fellows and opportunities
for tyranny and extortion possessed by no autocrat of any previous em-
pire, visible or invisible, feudal or industrial. The people may well be
concerned by any gesture in that direction." JOHNSON, FEDERAL AND
STATE CONTROL OF WATER POWER. (1928) p. 114.
"65 S.Ct. 1332, 325 U.S. 589, 89 L.Ed. 1816 (1945) ; 66 S.Ct. 1, 325 U.S.
665, 89 L.Ed. 1857 (1945).
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Federal reservation is not important ..." for here there had
been compliance with State law, and compensation provided for.
The failure of the Supreme Court to declare affirmately
what the law is in regard to water rights is regretable for the
uncertainty that now exists in the law is not, to say the least,
conducive to a feeling of sec-rity in present and future holders
of water rights.' This is so, for as we have seen, 'exclusion' of
water users from the benefits of the flow of a navigable stream
without compensation is 'entirely within the government's dis-
cretion,' and the stream no longer must be found to be navigable
in fact for it is sufficient if it is navigable in law.' And, the
Federal government's paramount right exists not only in those
streams that are navigable in law, but also in their tributaries."
It is an idle question to ask how many rivulets and mountain
streams do not connect somewhere in their course to the ocean
with a stream that is navigable in law. Therefore, what guaranty
is there that these property rights will be recognized and pro-
tected ?
The apparent basis for the now existing western water right
is the Desert Land Act of 1866.' Section 8 of the Reclamation
law of 1902 purports to recognize and protect those rights. As
far as the decisions show, only two have interpreted this section.
In the early case of Burley v. U.S.,' it was held:
"The Act of June 17, 1902, not only recognizes the
Constitution and laws of the State providing for the ap-
propriation of its waters and the reclamation of its arid
lands, but it requires that the Secretary of the Interior,
in carrying out the provisions of the Act, shall proceed
in conformity with such laws.' 3'
The other decision is in a case involving similar rights to
those involved in the Gerlach case, and on the same river, the
San Joaquin.' Its import is somewhat limited by the fact that
it was decided just prior to the Gerlach case, and by a district
court; however, it is believed that regardless of this fact, certain
parts of the opinion serve to give a clear and correct exposition of
the law. In it, the court held:
" I. 352 U.S. at page 612, 616.
"This group includes all agricultural, industrial, municipal, and domestic
users.
"See note 10, 8upra.
"See note 13, supra.
"14 STAT. 253. See also, the Act of Feb. 26, 1897, 29 STAT. 599; Kinney,
op. cit. note 1 supra, at pages 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028.
"179 F. 1, 102 C.C.A. 429 (1910).
"Id. at page 9.
"Rank v. Krug, 90 F.S. 773 (1950).
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"The question of property in water rights is to be
determined by and under local and State law except in
so far as Congress may exercise its Constitutional power
to regulate navigable waters for flood control under
Const. Art. I, Sec. 8."
Here are two decisions where the question was directly
passed upon. In the first case, it was said that the Secretary of
the Interior was required to proceed in conformity with State
laws. As far as this limitation goes, the case merely requires
that when the government seeks to obtain water rights for rec-
lamation purposes, under its right as a proprietor of Western
lands, it must obtain rights in the same manner as any other seek-
ing to obtain similar rights. In other words, all the court says
is that the Desert Land Acts confer upon the States the power
of administration and regulation of the waters flowing within
its boundaries. The control, as distinct from the right to the
waters, is in the States. The second case cited expressly says
this is the situation. Under these rulings, if the government
chooses to proceed in conformity with State laws, the water rights
will be paid for; but, if the government chooses to proceed under
its navigation easement, there will be no compensation. There-
fore, it is apparent that up until the time the Gerlach case was
decided, whether or not vested rights in water were valuable, in
terms of whether they would be paid for when taken by the Fed-
eral government for one of its multi-purpose dam projects, de-
pended solely upon the wishes of the government as expressed
by Congress."
It is respectfully submitted that those readers of this very
recent decision who have interpreted it to mean that the Federal
government will hereafter be required to recognize and com-
pensate for vested water rights in the West, and feel that there
will now be a uniform rule that owners of water rights along a
navigable stream who are deprived of those rights will be com-
pensated, regardless of the reason for the destruction of the
right," and who believe that the "paramount rights theory" is re-
'Id. at page 789.
"If this interpretation is correct, it is interesting to take notice of the
fact that the wishes of the government are decided by a Congress in
which the seventeen states lying west of the 97th meridian have only
94 votes in the House of Representatives, and 34 votes in the Senate, as
compared with 341 votes, and 62 votes respectively in the other States
having little to no interest in preservation of water rights of the West.
WoRLD ALMANAC. (1951) p. 768.
838 CAL. L. REV. 758, 761.
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jected,' are giving more credit to the decision than is rightfully
due.
This is not to say that the Court's decision in the Gerlach
case is wrong, for it is clearly supportable when considered apart
from the question of the import to be given to the Reclamation
Act of 1902. It is supportable on the ground that the Court
placed it." And, as Kinney observes," rights in water may be
condemned under the power of eminent domain for agricultural
uses, with or without the condemnation of the land itself, but, in
such cases, there must be just compensation, otherwise there
would be a violation of the constitutional guaranties.
In support of the contention that the Court here did not
base its ruling upon any rejection of the "paramount rights
theory," it is suggested that the Court was bound to affirm the
judgment of the lower Court for two reasons.
I. Here, although the government asked the Court for a de-
cree absolving it from any duty to compensate, it had already
purchased and paid for these identical rights at the price allow-
ed by the lower court." Granting the fact that the Court refers
to this and states that it is not bound by administrative mistakes,
yet such was the situation here that if the Court had awarded a
judgment for the government, the money previously placed in
escrow would go to a third party, and the rightful claimant,
plaintiff in the original action, would receive nothing.'
II. The Federal government had no superior navigation
easement over this river, and therefore, it could not take away
claimants rights without compensation. That is to say, it could
only exert its power of eminent domain subject to the limitations
imposed by the 5th Amendment.' The Federal government did
not have a superior navigation easement because this, the San
Joaquin River, was not a navigable stream of the United States,
in contradistinction to a navigable stream of a State.
"38 Cm. L. Rsv. 600. "Presumably the principal point of general legal in-
terest with respect to Reclamation projects in the decision [Gerlach
case] is the rejection of the 'paramount rights theory'."
"See note 3, supra, at p. 962. "... the power of Congress to promote the
general welfare through large-scale projects for reclamation,... is now
as clear [under its power of eminent domain] and ample as its power
to accomplish the same results directly through resort to strained inter-
pretation of the power over navigation."
82 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATE& RIGHTS. (2d. ed. 1912) p. 1955. And
see note 29 supra, at page 11.
'See note 3 supra, at page 964.
""Id.
"U.S. Constitution. Fifth Amendment. "... nor shall private property
be taken for a public use without just compensation."
8
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That there is such a distinction between these two types of
streams has been recognized by writers," by Congress," and by
the courts." It is granted that in the main, this distinction will
seldom be important for the simple reason that there are very
few streams that are not tributaries to an interstate stream, yet
if there is such a distinction, this would seem to be a proper case
in which to recognize it.
This position is further strengthened by the Krug case" de-
cided just prior to the Gerlach case, wherein it was said:
".. - it is judicially noted that the San Joaquin
River is a natural water course; it, together with its
tributaries, arises and flows wholly within the State of
California;....
... neither the San Joaquin nor the Sacramento
Rivers are interstate streams .... ,"
This much being true, the Federal government stood, at the
time this action was commenced, in the position of a sovereign
exercising its power of eminent domain. And the Court so held."
Therefore, this was not a situation where the government could
invoke its superior easement and deprive claimants of their prop-
erty rights without compensation, and the Court did not hold
that compensation must be made for a taking of water rights in
all those cases where the government seeks to promote watershed
"Kinney, op. cit. 8upra, note 1, at page 575. "The navigable waters of a
State, as distinguished from those of the United States, are wholly un-
der the jurisdiction of the State wherein they are found .... A body of
water wholly within the boundaries of a single State or one which is
navigable only within a State, and on which can not be visited by ves-
sels coming from or going to, by continuous voyages, navigable waters
of other States, is not a navigable water body of the United States, and
is not within the jurisdiction of Congress."
"Federal Power Act, Sec. 3 (8), as amended Aug. 26, 1935, 49 STAT. 838.
"Navigable waters means those parts of streams or other bodies which
Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States,..."
"The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, at page 563 (1870). ". . . And they con-
stitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of
the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of
the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves,
or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which com-
merce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in
the customary modes in which commerce is conducted by water." And
see also U.S. v. The Montello, 78 U.S. 11 (Wall.) 411, 20 L.Ed. 191
(1870), and Gilman v. Philadelphia, note 19 supra. 56 Am. Jur. 656.
"See note 31 8upra.
"Id. at page 783.
'7IM. at page 795.
"See note 3 aupra, at page 963.
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development, flood protection, navigation, or conservation of
water for irrigation and domestic purposes.
In conclusion, this contention may be summed up as follows:
The Federal government was bound to compensate for claimant's
rights, not because the Court interpreted the Reclamation Acts
and amendments thereto as requiring it to do so, but because the
San Joaquin River is not a navigable stream of the United States
within the common definition of that term. Therefore, the Fed-
eral government could not exercise its superior navigation ease-
ment as it had the power to do over all navigable streams of the
United States and their tributaries under the Commerce Clause;
but it had to proceed in conformity with its power to promote
the general welfare, as limited by the Fifth Amendment.
In the light of the history of water in the United States,
it is difficult to see on what other grounds the decision may be
sustained. Historically, upon the cession of territories after the
Revolution, the United States became the owner of all the land
and water west of the Mississippi and, under the common law
rule, became the sole riparian proprietor. Being the exclusive
owner, subject only to those rights acquired by competent author-
ity before they were obtained by the United States, the Federal
government could dispose of them in such manner and by such
titles as it deemed advantageous. It is uniformly held that in
disposing of these rights to new states, it reserved the use of all
navigable waters to the public." The more recent cases have
extended this doctrine of reserved waters to include, not only
those waters navigable in fact, but also those navigable in law,
and their tributaries. With this historical background, there is
little room for a contention that the Gerlach case abolished the
"paramount rights theory," and requires the government in the
future to compensate for a taking of vested rights in a navigable
stream.
Even though it may be admitted that Congress has expressed
its intention to protest these vested rights,' and the courts have
purportedly enforced this policy, it is apparent that the power
of the Federal government may still, under the guise of proceed-
ing under the Commerce Clause, transcend the use of water
rights acquired under State law by freely taking water for multi-
purpose reclamation projects. It is apparent that, thus far,
provisions in Congressional acts relating to the development of
the arid west with respect to observance of State laws and rights
"Kinney, op. cit. note 1, supra, at pages 574, 634, 756.
5°See notes 14, 16, and 29, 8upra.
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acquired thereunder have had no effect in limiting the power of
the Federal government, or as a corollary, in protecting State
rights and the rights of individuals in those States.
It is in the interest of the States of the West and of the peo-
ple of those States that these rights be protected from further de-
privation without compensation. In order for this to be accom-
plished, more must be done than an insertion of a clause in Con-
gressional acts stating that it is the intention or the policy to
recognize such rights, for as we have seen, such has been done in
the past, and to no avail.
The final solution rests in Congress. It must be impressed
with the importance of the need for a recognition by it that
everything in regard to water should be done to advance the con-
cept that the right to, the control and regulation of, and the
utilization of water in the West should be in accord with the
principle that the highest use is for domestic consumption and
agricultural purposes; that water should be acquired only under
and with respect to State law; and that only by the payment of
just compensation may a person be divested of a valid water
right, regardless of whether it is in a navigable stream or not.
GILBERT' E. HYATT.
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